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THE MYSTERIOUS PERSISTENCE  
OF NON-CONSENSUAL NORMS  
ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
Aaron J. Ley, PhD,* Kathleen Searles, PhD, ** 
and Cornell W. Clayton *** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the popular imagination, the Supreme Court of the United States is often pic-
tured as a “[m]arble [t]emple.”1 The building’s neo-classical façade, sitting atop an im-
posing stairway of forty-four steps looking down on the Capitol building and Pennsylva-
nia Avenue is intended to give the illusion of a solemn institution that sits above the fray 
of political life and the ordinary mortals who work within it.2 But the Court is not a 
building.3 Nor is it a collection of nine black-robed judges.4 Rather, the Supreme Court 
is a collection of rules, norms, and ideas.5 Some of these are very complicated, such as 
the idea of judicial review or judicial impartiality.6 Some are more straightforward, such 
as the norm requiring secrecy about the Court’s deliberations, the principle of “majority 
rule [when] deciding cases,” or the idea of respecting seniority during conference discus-
sions.7 Very few of these normative structures are formalized in laws or statutes.8 Most 
are simply customary habits of thought or traditions which, by their very nature, are al-
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 1.  David M. O’Brien, Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On Reconsidering the Rise of 
Individual Opinions, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 91, 103 
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) [hereinafter O’Brien, Institutional Norms]. 
 2. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 1 (2007). 
  3.  See Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive Institutionalism 
and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW 
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 65, 65 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999). 
 4.  See id.  
 5. See id.  
 6.  O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 91. 
 7.  Id.; see also Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual Norms in the Su-
preme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 874, 876 (1998). 
 8.  See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 71 (1996); and Caldeira & Zorn, 
supra note 7, at 876. 
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terable without any formal process that would mark a clear break from past practices.9 
One important norm that has puzzled scholars over the years involves opinion-
writing on the Court.10 Past empirical research demonstrates that norms governing con-
sensus in opinion-writing on the Court have undergone important changes,11 changes 
that are apparent in National Federal of Independent Business v. Sebelius,12 the land-
mark decision which produced four total opinions reflecting severe disagreement among 
the Justices.13 According to the now familiar story, throughout the nineteenth century and 
up until the 1940s, the Court was able to decide roughly 80% to 90% of its cases by 
unanimous opinion.14 Since the 1940s, fewer than one-half, and in recent decades only 
about one-third of its decisions have been unanimous.15 This collapse in unanimity has 
been accompanied by a dramatic surge in separate opinions (both dissents and concur-
rences).16 Indeed, this fracturing of the Court’s consensual decisions inspired one of the 
major political science innovations in the study of the Court—the so-called “attitudinal 
model” of Supreme Court decision-making.17 In their seminal article, Walker, Epstein, 
and Dixon argue that the collapse in consensual opinion-writing norms was the result of 
changes in leadership on the Court and the role of different Chief Justices.18 O’Brien, on 
the other hand, has argued that the collapse in consensual decisions was an artifact of ju-
risprudential dissensus on the Court, in particular the fissures within legal liberalism 
brought to the Court by Roosevelt appointees.19 
If factors such as the leadership of Chief Justices or acute jurisprudential fissures 
explain the decline in consensual decisions, they do not explain why consensual opinion-
writing norms have not returned since the 1980s. Since then, strong and influential Chief 
Justices (i.e., William Rehnquist and John Roberts) have made a return to consensual 
norms on the Court a priority.20  Moreover, since 1994, the Court has been dominated by 
                                                 
 9.  Id.  
 10.  See O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1; and Caldeira & Zorn, supra note 7; Thomas G. Walker, 
Lee Epstein & William J. Dixon, On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Su-
preme Court, 50 J. POL. 361, 384-88 (1988); Stacia L. Haynie, Leadership and Consensus on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 54 J. POL. 1158 (1992). 
 11.   See, e.g., Caldeira & Zorn, supra note 7, at 899-901; Haynie, supra note 10, at 1166-68; Walker, Ep-
stein & Dixon, supra note 10, at 384-86 (1988). 
 12. Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 13.  Id. at 2577, 2609, 2642, 2677. 
 14.  O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 93.  
 15.  Id. at 95. 
 16.  Id. at 109. 
 17. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL REVISITED (2002) (discussing the attitudinal model and how that model can be used to explain Su-
preme Court decision-making). 
 18.  Walker, Epstein & Dixon, supra note 10, at 378-84; see also Haynie, supra note 10, at 1166 (confirm-
ing the conclusions of Walker, Epstein, and Dixon that different leadership on the Court is important to under-
standing changes in the issuance of consensus opinions). Cf. Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, 
The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362, 364 (2001) (the article is not con-
cerned with identifying a cause of the rise in individual opinions, such as changes in leadership, but instead 
focuses on whether a consensus norm actually existed).  
 19. O’Brien,  Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 100-02. 
 20.   See William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justices I Never Knew, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 637, 641, 648 
(1976); See Cornell W. Clayton & Lucas K. McMillan, The Roberts Court in an Era of Polarized Politics, 10 
FORUM J. APPLIED RES. CONTEMP. POL. 136 (2013). 
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 49 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss1/4
LEY (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2013  7:23 PM 
2013] THE MYSTERIOUS PERSISTENCE 101 
GOP appointees who reject the legal liberalism that O’Brien argues accompanied the 
New Deal-Great Society political regime.21 In light of this inconsistency, why have non-
consensual norms persisted despite new leadership and the appointment of justices who 
have rejected the legal liberalism of the Warren Court era? 
In this paper, we argue that the persistence of non-consensual opinions is the prod-
uct of two important factors. The first factor is the existence of fissures within conserva-
tive jurisprudence itself. Similar to fissures in legal liberalism, both divisions are the leg-
acy of legal realism and the restructuring of legal thought that ties law more explicitly to 
political values.22 The neo-formalistic nature of conservative legal thought, especially the 
“originalism”23 that explicitly rejects realism, should produce more consensus after the 
New Right’s consolidation on the Court.24 If non-consensual norms persist despite this 
consolidation, or if conservative appointees concur more often than Democratic appoin-
tees, then we are on firm empirical ground that fissures within conservative legal thought 
may be a factor contributing to the persistence of non-consensual norms. The second fac-
tor that influences opinion-writing has institutional foundations. We argue that the shift 
toward more consensual opinion-writing practices is adversely affected by institutional 
factors such as the Court’s declining caseload, an increase in the number of clerks, and 
the embracing of computers and new legal research technology. We argue that each of 
these institutional factors has reduced the “costs” of writing separately and encouraged 
the persistence of non-consensual opinion-writing norms. Additionally, we find that a 
number of background characteristics also influence the decision to write separately. 
II. SUPREME COURT COLLEGIALITY AND OPINION-WRITING PRACTICES HISTORICALLY 
When the Supreme Court decides a case, each Justice has a decision to make: he or 
she may join the Court’s opinion, he or she may dissent without writing or joining a sep-
arate opinion, he or she may write or join a separate dissent, or he or she may choose to 
write or join a separate concurring opinion.25 Writing separately presents a cost: a Justice 
must expend resources and time that he or she might otherwise devote to activities on or 
off the Court.26 It also distracts from the Court’s institutional role in providing a clear 
and stable understanding of the law.27 On the other hand, writing separately offers Jus-
tices the ability to express themselves as individuals.28 These opinions are an opportunity 
to persuade other judges or judicial constituencies toward his or her view of the correct 
                                                 
 21.  O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 101-02. 
 22.  See Cornell W. Clayton, Supreme Court and Political Jurisprudence: New and Old Institutionalisms, in 
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 15, 16-17 (Cornell W. Clayton & 
Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (discussing a consequence of the legal realist movement that the law was “inti-
mately connected” to political values). 
 23.   See generally TOOBIN, supra note 2, at 15 (defining the term “originalism”). 
 24.  See Clayton, supra note 22, at 16-17 (explaining the realism movement). 
 25.  O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 91. 
 26.  See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL 
BEHAVIOR (2006) (discussing how it is important for Supreme Court Justices to maintain relationships with a 
variety of audiences both inside and outside of the Court). 
 27.  See TOOBIN, supra note 2, at 45. 
 28.  See O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 104-05. 
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Figure 1: Proportion 
Unanimous Decisions 
legal policy,29 or to garner personal attention or notoriety for himself or herself.30 In oth-
er words, the decision to write separately involves a balancing of institutional goals and 
interests against the personal costs and benefits of such opinions, and in this sense, that 
changing balance is at the heart of the Court’s consensual opinion-writing practices.31 
Figure 1 shows the proportion of cases decided each term by unanimous opinion.32 
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court decided the vast ma-

















Roughly 80% to 90% of all its decisions during this period were unanimous.34 This 
changed in the 1940s, when the consensual norms governing opinion-writing eroded 
sharply.35 Indeed, by 1942, the proportion of cases decided by unanimous opinion for the 
first time fell below 50%; and since the 1970s, the Court has reached unanimity in only 
about one-third of its cases.36 In addition, the number of separate opinions (dissents and 
concurrences) has grown sharply in recent decades, from less than one separate opinion 
per case in 1937, to nearly four separate opinions per case by 1985.37 
By any measure, this is a dramatic change and a fundamental transformation in the 
Court as a collegial institution. What explains the “mysterious demise” of the Court’s 
consensual norms? One important factor identified by previous scholarship is changes in 
                                                 
 29. Baum, supra note 26, at 51. 
 30. Gregory A. Caldeira, In the Mirror of the Justices: Sources of Greatness on the Supreme Court, 10 POL. 
BEHAV. 247, 255 (1988). 
 31.   See BAUM, supra note 26, at 51; O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 104-05; TOOBIN, supra 
note 2, at 45; Caldeira, supra note 30, at 255. 
 32.  LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, & DEVELOPMENTS 151-
58 (4th ed. 2007). 
 33.  O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 93. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 97. 
 36.  Id. at 95. 
 37.   EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 152-53, 157-58. 
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the leadership practices of Chief Justices.38 As the first among equals,39 the Chief Justice 
can assert leadership over the Court in several ways.40 By tradition, the Chief presides 
over and directs conference sessions where the Justices discuss and vote on cases, and 
when voting with the majority, assigns who writes the opinion for the Court.41 In exer-
cising these powers, Chief Justices can be good “task” leaders, good “social” leaders, or 
both.42 A good task leader directs and guides conference discussions with force and 
clarity, assigns and writes more opinions than his colleagues, and conducts the Court’s 
business with efficiency.43 By contrast, social leadership involves easing tensions and 
disagreements between the Justices and facilitating interpersonal relations and collegial 
interactions on the Court.44 
The norm that the Court should strive to reach is a unanimous, institutional opin-
ion, which the Court established during the leadership of John Marshall, who served as 
Chief Justice from 1801-1835.45 Such opinions advance the institutional interests of the 
Court by allowing it to speak in a unified voice and to present a clear, stable view of the 
law.46 These opinions also bolster the Court’s legitimacy47 and reinforce a sense of judi-
cial impartiality and objectivity.48 Marshall transformed the early Court from the English 
model of seriatim opinion-writing, where individual Justices wrote separately in each 
case, to a model where separate opinions were discouraged and institutional opinions for 
the Court as a whole became the norm.49 Those norms largely persisted throughout the 
remainder of the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century.50 It was under 
Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone that the opinion-writing norms of the Court took the 
most dramatic turn.51 The impact of Stone’s leadership on the opinion-writing practices 
of the Court is clearly seen in Figures 2 and 3, depicting the proportion of cases decided 




                                                 
 38. See, e.g., Caldeira & Zorn, supra note 7, at 900; Haynie, supra note 10, at 1166; Walker, Epstein & 
Dixon, supra note 10, at 361-64. 
 39.  See Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Chief Justice of the United States: Primus Inter Pares, J. OF PUB. L. 
17, 20-60 (1968) (discussing the concept of first among equals). 
 40.  See Sue Davis, The Chief Justice and Judicial Decision-Making: The Institutional Basis for Leadership 
on the Supreme Court, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVES 135, 
137 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999). 
 41.  Id. at 136. Daniel Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING, 237-38 (Joel B. Grossman & Richard S. Wells eds., 2d 
ed. 1980).  
 42.  Id. at 238. 
 43.  Id. at 237. 
 44.  Id.  
 45.  O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 92. 
 46.  See TOOBIN, supra note 2, at 45. 
 47.  O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 92. 
 48.  See id. 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id. at 93. 
 51.  See id. at 97. 
 52.  See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 152, 157. 
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In 1940, 16% of cases had a dissent53 and 3% had concurring opinions.54 By the 
time Stone left office in 1946, 56% included a dissent55 and 21% had a concurring opin-
ion.56 
A confluence of factors also catalyzed the changing norms governing the Court’s 
opinion-writing during this period.57 One factor was the rapid turnover of personnel.58 
                                                 
 53.  See id. at 152. 
 54.  See id. at 157. 
 55.  See id. at 152. 
 56.  See id. at 157. 
 57.  See generally BAUM, supra note 26; EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32; O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra 
note 1; DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., CAMPAIGNS & THE COURT: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (1999). 










































Figure 3: Proportion of Cases 








































Figure 2: Proportion of 
Decisions with at Least One 
Dissenting Opinion 
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On average, and throughout history, one new Supreme Court Justice will be appointed to 
the bench every two years.59 Having made no appointments to the Court during his first 
term, however, Roosevelt made eight appointments to the Court in the six-year period 
between 1937 and 1943.60 He elevated Stone, who was originally appointed by Calvin 
Coolidge, to the Chief Justiceship.61 By 1946, when Stone died, the entire Court had 
been appointed by Roosevelt.62 During Stone’s Chief Justiceship, one new Justice was 
added to the Court nearly each year, leading to an influx of malleable newcomers on the 
Court.63 As the longest serving member of a Court with little institutional memory, 
Stone’s views about opinion-writing met with little resistance from other Justices who 
had not been socialized in the traditions of consensus.64 
Other changes also facilitated the rise of separate opinions.65 For instance, 
throughout the nineteenth century, the author of a Court’s opinion did not circulate a 
draft of his opinion but, instead, read them during conferences where other Justices could 
suggest changes.66 During the 1920s, with the technological advancement of typewriters, 
the practice of reading opinions aloud during conferences so that other Justices could 
make suggestions changed.67 Justices also began adding more personnel to the Court by 
hiring law clerks.68 Horace Gray was the first Justice to hire a clerk, but the practice 
caught on among the other Justices.69 By the time Stone assumed leadership of the Court 
in 1941, it was a well-established practice for each Justice to have a clerk, and Stone 
himself hired a second clerk.70 With typewriters and clerks making court operations 
more efficient, the Justices began to circulate draft opinions prior to their conference dis-
cussions.71 This gave Justices more time to consider writing separate opinions.72 Moreo-
ver, with help from their clerks in researching and writing drafts, the cost associated with 
writing a separate opinion diminished.73 
It is also argued that one of the most important factors leading to the decline in 
consensual decision-making was declining consensus about the law itself.74 As O’Brien 
has argued, Roosevelt’s appointments to the Court all “embodied the intellectual forces 
of a generation of progressive liberals who had revolted against the legal formalism of 
                                                 
 59.  STEPHENSON, supra note 57, at 194.  
 60.  EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 178. 
 61.   BAUM, supra note 26, at 83-84 n.21. 
 62.  See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 178. 
 63.  See id.  
 64.  See O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 98-99. 
 65.  See id.  
 66.  Id. at 102. 
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id. at 103. 
 69.  TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME 
COURT LAW CLERK 43 (2006). 
 70.  O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 103. 
 71.  Id. at 102. 
 72.  See id. at 103. 
 73.  See id. 
 74.  Id. at 101.  
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the old conservative order.”75 The legal liberalism of these Justices, which dominated the 
Court’s jurisprudence from 1937 through the 1980s, grew out of the American Legal Re-
alism movement, which highlighted the indeterminacy of the law and linked judicial de-
cision-making explicitly to the political and social values of judges.76 By emphasizing 
pragmatism and the balancing of competing values over fixed formulas, Realism made 
consensus on the Court more unlikely, and at the same time placed a new premium on 
how judges justified their decisions, thus, leading to the importance of separate opin-
ions.77 
The impact of Realism in breaking down the doctrinal consensus of the old legal 
order was further exacerbated by the shortcomings of American legal liberalism itself. 
The legal liberals of the mid-twentieth century embraced diverse viewpoints and lacked a 
single coherent approach to constitutional interpretation or the role of the Court.78 Disa-
greements about the role of the Court and the proper interpretive approach to the law re-
quired Justices to write more individual opinions to articulate and defend their views, 
even when they agreed on the outcome of a case.79 Thus, the post-New Deal Justices 
were socialized into higher rates of individual expression than previous Justices, and ac-
cording to O’Brien, “virtually all tended to increase their dissent and concurring behavior 
during their time on the bench.”80 
Thus, while Stone’s leadership on the Court may have contributed to the devalua-
tion of consensual opinion-writing norms, other factors, especially changes in the very 
structures of American legal thought, played an equally important part in this process.81 
Indeed, as data in Figures 1-3 illustrate, concurring opinions were on the rise, and the 
proportion of unanimous decisions were declining prior to Stone’s Chief Justiceship.82 
Both trends continued for three decades after Stone’s departure.83 In short, agreement on 
an institutional opinion for the Court used to be deemed “central to the Court’s prestige 
and legitimacy.”84 The combination of changes in leadership and tensions inherent in le-
gal liberalism brought to the Court by New Deal Justices transformed that norm into one 
of individual expression.85 By the 1940s, less than a majority of cases was decided unan-
imously and by the 1960s less than one-third were decided unanimously.86 Indeed, by the 
Court’s 1969 term, the number of separate opinions had skyrocketed and the decisions of 
the Court were, on average, accompanied by four separate opinions.87 
                                                 
 75. Id.  
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id.  
 78. See KALMAN, supra note 8, at 71.  
 79. See THOMAS KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN 
JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 65-66 (2004). 
 80. O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 105. 
 81.  See generally EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32; O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1. 
 82.  See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 156-57.  
 83.  See id. at 157-58. 
 84.  O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 111. 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. at 93-95. 
 87.   See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 152, 157. 
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III. LEADERSHIP AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE REHNQUIST COURT –  
RESTORING CONSENSUAL NORMS? 
If leadership and the tensions inherent in legal liberalism explain declining consen-
sual norms in the Court’s opinion-writing practices between the 1930s and 1960s, they 
cannot fully explain why there has not been a return to more consensual norms. This is 
especially true of the post-1980s period, during which time the Court had been remade 
by Republican presidents with Justices who rejected legal liberalism and who were 
committed to a New Right constitutional agenda.88 The fact that the Court and constitu-
tional law have been remade by the New Right Republican Party should be no surprise. 
Republican presidents since Richard Nixon have campaigned against the Court and 
railed against what they perceived as its liberal bias.89 The legal liberalism of the Warren 
Court in particular, they argued, warped constitutional law with the invention of new 
rights (such as the right to privacy), and its embrace of judicial activism over Frankfur-
ter’s or Black’s arguments for restraint.90 Since 1968, Republican presidents have sought 
to appoint Justices who reject the legal liberalism and ensuing jurisprudential fissures 
associated with the Warren Court, while championing a new conservative activist juris-
prudence.91 This is especially true since 1980, when Ronald Reagan brought new rigor 
and systematic attention to the judicial selection process.92 
Republicans have won seven of eleven presidential elections since 1968, and the 
vast majority of federal judges today are Republican appointees, including five of the 
nine Justices on the current Court (Roberts, Alito, Thomas, Kennedy, and Scalia).93 
Moreover, all Republican Justices have been appointed since 1980, when Ronald Reagan 
moved the Republican Party significantly to the right; the other two Justices, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer, were both appointed by Bill Clinton, a “New Democrat,” 
who embraced many of the New Right’s political positions in key areas of constitutional 
law (such as federalism and criminal justice).94 If fragmented opinion-writing was the 
result of tensions inherent to legal liberalism alone, then those tensions should have dis-
appeared by 1992, when seven of the nine Justices on the Court had been appointed by 
Republican presidents and judicial conservatives consolidated their control over the 
Court. 
                                                 
 88.  See STEPHENSON, supra note 57, at 194-95. 
 89. See id. at 200-02.  
 90.  See id. at 196-202. 
 91. KECK, supra note 79, at 107-09. See MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 108-10 
(2003). 
 92. David M. O’Brien, The Reagan Judges: His Most Enduring Legacy?, in THE REAGAN LEGACY: 
PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 62 (Charles O. Jones, ed. 1988) [hereinafter O’Brien, The Reagan Judges]; 
MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATIONS 111-23 
(2007); DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF 
SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 133-34 (1999).  
 93.  See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 259.  
 94. See Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice: How the New Right 
Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94 GEO L.J. 1385, 1394 (2006) (discussing 
Clinton’s acceptance of the New Right legal policy agenda in various policy areas). 
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Furthermore, Ronald Reagan elevated William H. Rehnquist to be Chief Justice in 
1986.95 Rehnquist’s predecessor, Chief Justice Burger (1969-1986) had been an ineffec-
tual leader, often ridiculed by his colleagues for misunderstanding basic legal princi-
ples.96 Conference debates were rambling and confused, and Burger was unprepared and 
often angered his colleagues with his indecisiveness.97 In addition, Burger had to grapple 
with a Court that not only contained the jurisprudential fault lines of legal liberalism, but 
was increasingly conflicted by new divisions between liberals and the new judicial con-
servatives being appointed by Republican presidents.98 With the Justices increasingly 
divided over jurisprudential questions and without strong leadership to guide them in 
reaching consensus, the fragmented opinion-writing practices of the Court peaked during 
the Burger years as depicted in Figure 4, which shows the average number of separate 





                                                 
 95.  O’Brien, The Reagan Judges, supra note 92, at 60. 
 96.   See O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 109-10.  
 97. Id.  
 98.   See STEPHENSON, supra note 57, at 194-95. 
 99.  See The Supreme Court Database, http://scdb.wustl.edu/ (last visited June 9, 2013), from which cited 







Figure 4: Concurring and Dissenting 
Opinions 1953-2005  
(Average Number per Case) 
Avg No. of Concurrences Avg No. of Dissenting Opinions
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By contrast, Rehnquist was a highly effective leader by making decision-making 
more efficient, collegial, and consensual.100 As Chief Justice, he discouraged lengthy 
discussions during conferences and he streamlined the process of managing the Court’s 
caseload.101 Justice O’Connor characterized him as “concerned about efficiency. He 
didn’t want to waste time . . . [his] push for efficiency was a pretty good thing—to get on 
with the task and get the work done.”102 Indeed, even the most liberal Justices who 
served under Rehnquist respected his leadership; Thurgood Marshall called him “a great 
[C]hief [J]ustice,” and William Brennan described him as the “most all-around success-
ful” Chief he had served under—including Earl Warren.103  Rehnquist put a lot of effort 
into fostering collegial interactions on the Court, as a former clerk noted: 
 
He was very concerned about hurt feelings among the [J]ustices, and he 
was very careful and observant of the way that certain memos or inter-
actions would make other [J]ustices react or feel. He always avoided 
invective in his own memos, and smoothed over hurt feelings when 
other [J]ustices used it.104 
 
Most importantly, Rehnquist was eager to reassert consensual opinion-writing 
norms on the Court.105 Indeed, in an article about his predecessors in the Chief Justice’s 
office, he was critical of Stone and admired both Marshall and Taft, because, unlike 
Stone, they had the skill to bring together colleagues of different minds.106 Before being 
elevated to Chief Justice, Rehnquist was actually a frequent dissenter.107 As the most 
conservative member of the Burger Court, Rehnquist wrote separate opinions in nearly 
14% of the cases in which he participated, including so many solo dissents that he was 
given the nickname “Lone Ranger” and “Lone Dissenter.”108 After his elevation to the 
Chief’s position in 1986, his views and opinion-writing practices changed.109 As Chief 
Justice, Rehnquist wrote fewer separate opinions than any other member of the Court, 
writing dissents or concurrences in less than 4% of cases decided by the Court.110 
By all counts, Rehnquist’s successor as Chief Justice, John Roberts, is similarly re-
spected as a leader of the Court and concerned about restoring consensual opinion-
                                                 
 100.  Contra O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 110-11. 
 101. Id. at 110. 
 102. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR 
CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 15 (2007). 
 103. O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 110; JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE 
PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED AMERICA 194 (2007). 
 104. ROSEN, supra note 103, at 194. 
 105.  See Rehnquist, supra note 20, at 641, 649. 
 106. Id. at 648-49. 
  107.  John M. Nannes, The “Lone Dissenter,” 31 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 1, 2-3 (2006). 
 108. Id. at 3. 
 109. Saul Brenner & Timothy M. Hagle, Opinion Writing and Acclimation Effect, 18 POL. BEHAV. 235, 250-
51 (1996). 
 110. O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 106-07. 
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writing practices.111 In an interview in 2006, Roberts remarked, “I think that every 
[J]ustice should be worried about the Court acting as a Court and functioning as a Court, 
and they should all be worried, when they’re writing separately, about the effect on the 
Court as an institution.”112 During his confirmation hearings, Roberts expressed his de-
sire to help the Court speak with greater unanimity and to speak as an institution rather 
than a collection of nine individuals.113 As the Chief Justice, Roberts said he would en-
courage members of the Court to subordinate their “views of the correct jurisprudential 
approach and evaluate those views in terms of [their] role as a judge” and the institution-
al interest in “achieving consensus and stability.”114 
As suggested above, since 1986, the Court has been led by Chief Justices who are 
respected leaders and committed to restoring consensual opinion-writing norms. It has 
also been dominated by a new generation of New Right jurists who reject legal liberal-
ism. But despite these changes, the Court’s opinion-writing practices are as fragmented 
today as ever. What explains the continued persistence of fragmented opinion-writing 
norms on the Court? 
IV. THE MYSTERIOUS PERSISTENCE OF NON-CONSENSUAL OPINION-WRITING NORMS 
We argue that two factors have prevented the return of consensual opinion-writing 
practices on the Court, despite the leadership efforts of Rehnquist and Roberts and the 
replacement of liberal Justices with New Right Justices. 
A.  Fissures in Conservative Legal Thought: The Lasting Legacy of Realism. 
Simply because legal liberalism contained internal tensions that spurred separate 
opinion-writing, it does not follow that the abandonment of legal liberalism will lead to a 
restoration of consensual opinions. Indeed, Tushnet, Keck, and other scholars have sug-
gested that the judicial conservatism of Republican appointees to the Court since 1968 
contains its own internal tensions and divisions.115 Tushnet, for example, argues that the 
modern Republican Party is a coalition of economic and cultural conservatives with dif-
ferent substantive constitutional agendas.116 Keck has argued that a clear jurisprudential 
divide exists between a pragmatic judicial conservatism embraced by Justices such as 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Rehnquist, and a more formalistic judicial conservatism em-
braced by Justices such as Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Roberts.117 
If the legal conservatism of New Right Justices is similarly conflicted and incoher-
                                                 
 111. ROSEN, supra note 103, at 8. 
 112. Id.  
 113.  Douglas Kmiec, Assessing Chief Justice John Roberts at Mid-Term: Why He Deserves Kudos for His 
Ability to Lead the Supreme Court to Speak in One Constitutional Voice, FINDLAW (Feb. 19, 2007), 
http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/commentary/20070219_kmiec.html. 
 114.  ROSEN, supra note 103, at 7.  
  115.  See KECK, supra note 79, at 7; TUSHNET, supra note 91, at 102-05. 
  116. TUSHNET, supra note 91, at 17-18. It is important to note their economic efforts focus on limiting con-
gressional regulatory power, expanding protection of corporations and private property rights, and upholding 
markets; whereas cultural conservatives focus on overturning abortion rights, limiting affirmative action, and 
lowering the wall separating church-state. 
  117.  KECK, supra note 79, at 7-8. 
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ent as the legal liberalism of the New Deal Justices, then the impact on the Court’s opin-
ion-writing practices should be similar. In particular, during the 1930s and early 1940s, 
as traditional legal doctrines and constitutional understandings came under attack from 
New Deal appointees, the level of dissent on the Court increased.118 Concurring opinions 
did not grow nearly as rapidly during this period, as the new liberal Justices unified in 
their opposition to existing legal doctrines and constitutional interpretations.119 However, 
once a majority of New Deal Justices firmly established control over the direction of the 
Court’s decisions, there was a surge in the number of concurring opinions as the new lib-
eral Justices began to express and address the divisions within legal liberalism itself.120 A 
similar pattern should exist on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. There should be an ini-
tial increase in the number of dissents as New Right Justices increasingly voice their dis-
approval of existing constitutional doctrines and understandings. Once New Right Justic-
es consolidated their control over the Court by the early 1990s, however, we expect a 
drop in the level of dissents, and an increase in the incidence of concurring opinions, as 
the new conservative majority consolidated its control and then turned to grapple with 
the tensions inherent in legal conservatism. 
A review of separate opinions as a percentage of Court opinions presented again in 
Figure 4 supports our expectations. From the late-1960s through the mid-1980s, dissents 
grew more rapidly than concurrences. Once New Right Republican Justices began to 
dominate the Court, however, average concurrences grew at a greater rate than dissenting 
opinions. It was not until 1992 that the average number of concurring opinions (one per 
case) actually surpassed the average number of dissenting opinions (.88 per case) on the 
Court since 1953. Dissensus was low during this time period (.84 per case in 1997) and 
the average number of concurrences had reached rather high levels in comparison to oth-
er time periods (e.g., in 1995 the Court averaged 1.75 concurring opinions per case).121 
B.  The Normative Infrastructure of Separate Opinion-Writing. 
A final factor that has prevented the reestablishment of consensual opinion-writing 
practices on the Court is the lack of what we call the “normative infrastructure” to en-
courage consensual behavior. Indeed, the existing institutional arrangements support 
non-consensual practices and frustrate any efforts of the Chief Justice to change those 
practices. We argue that these institutional arrangements have encouraged separate opin-
ions and discouraged consensual behavior. 
1. Computerization and new technology.   
The technological infrastructure of the Court underwent a process of rapid modern-
ization and computerization during the 1970s and 1990s. With fax machines, computer 
technology, and word processors leading to heightened efficiency in both the private and 
public sector, there is also reason to believe that new technology contributes to the per-
                                                 
  118.  O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 101.  
  119.  Id.  
  120.  But see id. at 101-02. 
  121. See Supreme Court Database, supra note 99. 
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sistence of non-consensual norms by lowering the costs, or burden, to individual Justices 
of writing separate opinions. In the late 1970s, the first set of computer terminals was 
installed in the Supreme Court building, reducing the costs of information searches and 
staying abreast of developments within the legal profession.122 Access to legal databases 
such as Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw became available to Justices in the late 1980s, and fur-
ther reduced the time expenditures necessary for legal research.123 Indeed, technological 
developments may serve an even greater function outside of the Justices’ chambers. With 
access to computer technology, law clerks and librarians within the Supreme Court 
building are able to quickly compile information not available prior to the computer age. 
We therefore expect and test whether access to this technology increases the average 
number of separate opinions written per year, per Justice. 
2.  The role of law clerks and the decreasing number of cases heard on the merits.   
Previous research has demonstrated the important role that clerks play in the deci-
sion-making processes of the Court.124 For the purposes of this analysis, we argue that 
the presence of additional law clerks expands the capacity of individual Justices to write 
separate opinions.125 It is reasonable to expect that increases in the number of law clerks 
will lower the opportunity costs associated with researching and drafting separate opin-
ions. 
Until 1919, the employment of law clerks was ad hoc and paid for privately by the 
individual Justices themselves.126 From 1919, when Congress authorized funding for the 
positions, until 1941, each Justice was assigned two assistants, one of which performed 
the duties of a law clerk.127 It was not until 1942 that the number of law clerks assigned 
to Supreme Court Justices doubled.128 At this time, law clerks were also given more 
freedom in the decision-making process, drafting opinions and managing the burgeoning 
certiorari process.129  
The added number of clerks and their contributions to the Supreme Court’s work 
since 1942 appears to have impacted the number of opinions written by the Justices.130 
                                                 
 122.  O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 110. 
 123.  See David M. O’Brien, Managing the Business of the Supreme Court, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 667, 671 
(1985) [hereinafter O’Brien, Managing the Business]. 
 124. See, e.g., BRADLEY J. BEST, LAW CLERKS, SUPPORT PERSONNEL, AND THE DECLINE OF CONSENSUAL 
NORMS ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1935-1995, at 232 (2002); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO 
DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 70 (1991); ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. 
WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
231 (2006); O’Brien, Managing the Business, supra note 123, at 672; Todd C. Peppers & Christopher J.W. 
Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 
51, 76-77 (2009). 
 125. See BEST, supra note 124, at 214. 
 126. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 135 (8th ed. 2008) 
[hereinafter O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER] (discussing how Horace Gray began the practice of personally hiring 
law clerks, a practice which Oliver Wendell Holmes continued until Congress appropriated funding for the hir-
ing of law clerks). 
 127. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 124, at 34. 
 128. Id. at 36. 
 129.  Peppers & Zorn, supra note 124, at 55-58. 
 130.  See O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1, at 110. 
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With law clerks increasingly contributing to the opinion-writing process, the proportion 
of unanimous decisions decreased from approximately .61 in 1941, to .49 in 1942, a .12 
total decrease.131 The proportion of unanimous decisions only continued to decrease, 
possibly due to the establishment of divisions of labor and specialization of duties in the 
Justices’ chambers. 
 
In Table 1, the proportion of unanimous decisions are divided into three time peri-
ods specified by Ward and Weiden: 1919-1941, when law clerks traditionally performed 
the role of research assistants; 1942-1969, when two clerk positions were established for 
each Justice; and 1970-present, when Justices were assigned a third and then a fourth law 
clerk.132 Table 1 shows the dramatic decrease in the proportion of unanimous decisions 
rendered by the Court between 1919-1941, and 1942-1969, corresponding with a de-
crease in the proportion of unanimous decisions. However, the addition of the third and 
then a fourth law clerk after 1969 corresponded with a .03 increase in the proportion of 
unanimous decisions by the Court.133 From these data alone, it is therefore difficult to 
argue conclusively what impact additional law clerks may have had on the opinion-
writing norms of the Court. Our intention below is to perform a more rigorous examina-
tion of how the increase in law clerks combined with other factors—such as changes in 
technology and fissures in legal thought—to influence the Court’s norms, and we expect 
that the addition of law clerks will increase the average number of separate opinions 
written per year, per Justice. 
3.  The decreasing number of cases heard on the merits.   
The Judges Bill of 1925 was a major step toward giving the Supreme Court discre-
tionary control over its docket.134 Since that time, the Court has enjoyed nearly complete 
                                                 
 131.  EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 152, 157. 
 132. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 124, at 22-23. 
 133.  Supreme Court Database, supra note 99. 
  134. See 68th Cong. ch. 229, February 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936; see also EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 46. 
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discretion over the number of cases it will decide each term. While the number of cases 
that the Court has heard and decided each term has fluctuated since the Court gained dis-
cretionary control, there has been a dramatic decline in that number since the 1980s. In 
1926, the Court rendered opinions in nearly 200 cases, but by the 1980s, that number had 
decreased to about 150 cases,135 and in 2002, the Court produced only 74 decisions.136 
As the Court decides fewer cases, the Justices are free to spend more time deciding each 
case, and it would be reasonable to expect that they are freer to write more separate opin-
ions as they are deciding these cases. We expect that the decreasing number of cases 
heard on the merits will increase the average number of separate opinions written per 
year, per justice. 
4.  Use of the Supreme Court’s certiorari pool.   
We also suspect that a Justice’s use of the certiorari pool will lead Justices to au-
thor more separate opinions. The adoption of the certiorari pool in 1972 was an organi-
zational reform in response to the heightened workload of the Court, particularly the in-
creasing number of unpaid petitions, which composed about 50% of the docket.137 By 
pooling the burden of reviewing certiorari petitions and creating common certiorari 
memos for the Justices in the vast majority of cases that come to the Court, the certiorari 
pool frees both the time of the Justices and their clerks from the certiorari stage so that 
more time can be devoted to opinion-writing functions. Some Justices, however, have 
chosen not to participate in the pool and have even elected to screen those petitions 
themselves. Justices Stevens, Marshall, Brennan, and Alito opted out of the pool;138 we 
expect non-participation to adversely impact the Justices’ ability to write separate opin-
ions.139 Therefore, we predict that access to the certiorari pool will increase the average 
number of separate opinions written per year, per justice. 
5.  Other individual-level factors.   
A long line of research on Supreme Court decision-making suggests that Justices 
vote according to several individual level characteristics, such as their ideological pre-
dispositions or “attitudes.”140 Just as the so-called attitudinal model demonstrates that 
individual-level characteristics of Justices shape their voting behavior, we expect that 
ideology and other personal characteristics of the Justices, such as their ages, their pro-
fessional backgrounds, or their seniority on the Court may influence their determination 
to write separate opinions. As Justices become older, for instance, they may encounter a 
variety of new obstacles that take away from the time they devote to opinion-writing. 
The professional background of Justices may also be a factor. Justices who were law pro-
                                                 
 135.  ESPTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 156, 158. 
 136.  Id. at 158.  
 137. See O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER, supra note 126, at 140. 
 138.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 124, at 121; Adam Liptak, A Second Justice Opts Out of a Longtime  
Custom: The ‘Cert. Pool’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/washington/26memo.html?_r=0. 
  139.  Liptak, supra note 138.   
 140. See, e.g., SEGAL, & SPAETH, supra note 17, at 86.  
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fessors, for example, may have a history of voicing their own opinions in law journals 
and academic work, and we might therefore expect them to be more inclined to write 
separately once they are on the Court.141 Finally, we also expect extremely conservative 
justices, as measured by their Martin-Quinn scores, to feel more passionately about their 
positions and to find less in common with others on the Court, thus leading them to au-
thor more separate opinions.142 When median justices are assigned the writing of opin-
ions to bring together majorities, justices on the extreme ends of the ideological continu-
um should be more likely to voice their disapproval of the opinion’s reasoning. In 
summary, we expect individual-level characteristics, such as professional background, 
rank, and ideological orientation to influence the average number of separate opinions 
written per year, per justice. 
V.  TESTING FOR THE PERSISTENCE OF NON-CONSENSUAL NORMS 
To test the expectations set forth above, we now examine how the normative infra-
structure on the Court has influenced the decision of Justices to write separately, with a 
special focus on concurring opinions. Above, we have argued that fissures within juris-
prudential thought existed both in legal liberalism and now in the New Right’s constitu-
tional agenda. While we agree with Haynie that dissents indicate the general level of ide-
ological disagreement on the Court, we argue that the number of concurring opinions 
best indicate the level of dissensus within the majority coalition at any given time, and 
for this reason, are an apt individual-level indicator of the persistence of non-consensual 
norms.143 After all, the decision to write a concurrence presents a higher cost to the jus-
tices and to the majority coalition as a whole because separate concurrences detract from 
the ability to offer clear guidance in a unified voice to judicial audiences about the ma-
jority coalitions’ policy view. 
Shifts in consensual norms among Supreme Court Justices (as evidenced in varia-
tion of the levels of concurrences) occur slowly, characteristic of long-term and long-
memory processes, and vary by the leadership of Chief Justices.144 Like Haynie, and 
Caldeira and Zorn, we accept the assumption that levels of concurrences on the Court are 
functions of consensual norms.145 Unlike these authors who focus on changes in norms at 
the macro-level, we look to the lack of change in non-consensual norms at the level of 
the individual Justice to advance our claim that changes in institutional infrastructure 
have potentially impacted the ability of strong Chief Justices to alter the opinion-writing 
                                                 
 141. PAMELA C. CORLEY, CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 33 (2010). 
 142.  We consider Martin-Quinn scores to be an appropriate and superior measure in testing for the effects of 
ideology on opinion-writing behavior, given their ability to measure ideology over time. In other words, some 
measures of ideology do not account for the likelihood that other variables (e.g., docket change) bias measure-
ments, especially measures that assume that time is invariant. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dy-
namic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, at 10 
POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002). 
 143.  Haynie, supra note 10, at 1158.   
 144. Caldeira & Zorn, supra note 7, at 874. 
 145. Our approach focuses solely on concurrences which reflect a high degree of disagreement over the rea-
soning of majority opinions. But see id. at 877-78; see also Haynie, supra note 10 (using both dissents and con-
currences to measure the breakdown of consensual norms on the Court). 
17
Ley et al.: The Mysterious Persistence of Non-Consensual Norms on the U.S. Su
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
LEY (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2013  7:23 PM 
116 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:99 
behavior of the Justices. Specifically, an increase in institutional capacity (including ac-
cess to computers, use of the certiorari pool, and increased access to law clerks) influ-
ences Supreme Court Justices’ decisions to write separately, leading to the persistence of 
non-consensual norms, despite efforts by the Chief Justice to reassert more consensual 
opinion-writing practices. 
Our argument draws on both rational choice theory and new institutionalism; insti-
tutional capacity enables justices to make the strategic decision to write separately. In the 
qualitative evidence proffered above, we offer several reasons the current normative in-
frastructure encourages separate opinion-writing and discourages consensual behavior. In 
an effort to build upon these qualitative findings, the quantitative model presented below 
examines the individual and institutional characteristics which predict the expected num-
ber of concurrences an individual Justice will strategically choose to write per year, par-
ticularly the lowered opportunity costs of making such a choice. 
We hypothesize that increased access to law clerks, use of the certiorari pool, new 
technology (access to Lexis-Nexis and word processors), along with the number of cases 
on the docket, reinforces a normative infrastructure, which enables non-consensual 
norms to manifest in concurrence-writing. Additionally, we include individual-specific 
covariates such as age, professional experience, ideological orientation, and position on 
the court (Chief Justice or not) in our model. 
We utilize a random-intercept Poisson regression model to estimate the likelihood 
that a Supreme Court Justice’s decision to write separately is a function of institutional 
capacity.146 This approach allows us to contribute to the work of Walker et al., Haynie, 
and Caldeira and Zorn, by offering a unique look at micro-level Supreme Court decision-
making.147 Moreover, the model enables us to disentangle the influence of within persons 
effects while uncovering the impact of institutional capacity and Justice-specific charac-
teristics on the Court’s operational norms.148 We suggest that significant institutional co-
variates indicate that the decision to write separately is influenced by the institutional en-
vironment, in part explaining the persistence of non-consensual norms. Thus while 
institutional memory may be long, as Caldeira and Zorn demonstrate, technology chang-
es the opinion-writing game and the choices Justices make.149 
 
 
                                                 
 146. See Nathaniel Beck & Jonathan N. Katz, Random Coefficient Models for Time-Series-Cross-Section 
Data (2004) (presented at the 2001 meeting of the American Political Science Association) (reviewing the ap-
propriate models for TSCS data, including the use of multilevel models such as the random-intercept); Na-
thaniel Beck, Time-Series Cross Section Data: What Have We Learned in the Past Few Years, 4 ANN. REV. 
POL. SCI. 271 (2001). 
 147.  See generally Caldeira & Zorn, supra note 7; Haynie, supra note 10; Walker, Epstein & Dixon, supra 
note 10. 
 148.  “Within persons effects” refers to the change within an individual justice over time. 
 149. Caldeira & Zorn, supra note 7, at 900. 
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VI. DATA 
The dependent variable, concurrences, is a count variable representing the number 
of concurrences written per year per Justice for the time period of 1953-2007.150 We in-
clude an offset variable, which treats the event counts (the number of concurrences writ-
ten by Justices each year) as a set of responses offset by the number of opportunities a 
Justice has to write a concurrence, including when they are sitting in the majority and not 
assigned to write the majority opinion (see Table 2).151 The data are measured in time-
ordered increments per individual with yearly observations nested in Justices, character-
istic of time-series-cross-sectional data (“TSCS”).152 The dataset consists of 421 obser-
vations, 55 time periods, nested in 23 Justices.153 Inherent to this sort of data structure 
are issues of dependence and unobserved heterogeneity. To capture the effects of cluster-






















                                                 
 150. Similar to Walker, Epstein & Dixon, we chose to base our analysis from data provided by the U.S. Su-
preme Court Database. Unlike Walker, Epstein & Dixon and Haynie, but similar to Caldeira & Zorn, we use 
the raw number of concurrences rather than the number of opinions per 100 decisions. See Caldeira & Zorn, 
supra note 7; Haynie, supra note 10; Walker, Epstein & Dixon, supra note 10. 
 151.  See infra Table 2. 
 152. Data organized by Justice, then by year.   
 153. Years in which an individual Justice did not write a concurrence were coded 0.   
 154.  See infra Table 2. We collected our individual background data from the most recent edition of the Su-
preme Court Compendium. Additional data compiled from the Supreme Court Database. See supra note 99. 
For the use of the certiorari pool, we retrieved data from O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER, supra note 126, at 140-41, 
197 (describing who has chosen to opt out of the certiorari pool). 
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Dependent variable representing the number of times each justice per year was sitting, in the ma-
jority, and not assigned to writing the majority opinion.   
 
Cert Use A binary dummy variable representing an individual justice’s use of the cert pool. 
 
Age Age of justice per year mean-centered.   
 
Lexis A binary dummy variable representing the start of Supreme Court personnel’s access to Lexis-
Nexis (1979).155   
 
Clerks An ordered binary dummy variable representing increased use of law clerks; the two time periods 
for which there was an increase in the number of law clerks included in our data from two clerks 
(1953-1969), to three and four clerks (1970-Present) per justice.   
 
Case Load Represents the number of cases on the Supreme Court docket measured by the number of signed 




A binary dummy variable representing the start of the Supreme Court personnel’s access to com-
puters (1980).   
 
Prof A binary dummy variable representing prior experience as a law professor from Epstein, Segal, 
Spaeth, and Walker (2006).  In addition to Full Professors and Assistant Professors at law 
schools, we chose to include those who served as Lecturers and Instructors because they, too, 
were exposed to the intellectual climate of the academic environment and classrooms.   
 
MQ Posterior mean, or ideal point, Martin-Quinn score for each individual justice per year.156 
 
CJ Term A binary dummy variable representing justice per year serving as the Chief Justice.   
 
Os (offset) The number of times a justice wrote a concurrence per year offset by the opportunities each jus-
tice had to write a concurrence per year; in other words the number of times a justice was sitting, 
in the majority, and not assigned to writing the majority opinion per year.   
 
By Just Random effect and unique identifier per judge panel which estimates a random intercept per jus-
tice to account for variability between justices to be modeled.   
 
To account for the TSCS and count characteristics of the model, we turn to a class 
of count models referred to as multilevel.157 These models include both fixed and ran-
dom effects at one, two, or more levels to account for unobserved heterogeneity of units 
and dependence.158 A random-intercept Poisson regression model was fit with a random 
                                                 
 155.  Despite our efforts to find an exact date for the introduction of Lexis Nexis to the Supreme Court build-
ing, we were only able to estimate an approximate date based upon anecdotal correspondence with former U.S. 
Supreme Court law clerks.  Nonetheless, an exact date for the introduction of the database to the building does 
not measure its use by Supreme Court law clerks.  In other words, there is no possible way of measuring the 
ability of law clerks or Supreme Court personnel to be familiar or efficient with the legal research database.   
 156.  See Martin & Quinn, supra note 142.  
 157. See generally SOPHIA RABE-HESKETH & ANDERS SKRONDAL, MULTILEVEL AND LONGITUDINAL 
MODELING USING STATA (2008); Marco R. Steenbergen & Bradford S. Jones, Modeling Multilevel Data Struc-
tures, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 218 (2002). A pooled Poisson with cluster-robust standard errors was also estimated 
with suspect results. 
 158. Fixed effects are estimated directly as standard regression coefficients. Random effects, on the other 
hand, are indirectly estimated according to the data’s structure, in this case by Justice. Random effects may be 
entered in to the equation as either intercepts or slopes. The distribution of the random effects is Gaussian and 
the log likelihood is approximated via adaptive Gaussian quadrature due to lack of closed form solution.   
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intercept at level one to model within panel correlation or variability between Justices 
because event count variables cannot be less than zero, and are inherently non-linear, 
making OLS regression inappropriate.159 To address within persons dependence, the 
model fits a separate regression line to each Justice with the lines constrained to have the 
same slope. 
VII. RESULTS 
Do institutional and individual covariates vary significantly in predicting the num-
ber of concurrences written per year by Justice? The random-intercept Poisson regression 
model results presented in Table 2 suggest the answer is yes. The significance of several 
covariates representing institutional capacity including access to computers, use of the 
certiorari pool, and increased access to law clerks support our hypothesis that the deci-
sion to write separately is influenced by the institutional environment. Individual-specific 
covariates, such as prior experience as a law professor and rank as a Chief Justice or As-
sociate Justice are also significant predictors. 
 
 
Table 3 Predictors of Concurrence-writing 
 




Cert Use -.1679118* .845* .0844783 
Age .0055277 1.006 .0046253 
Lexis .0815572 1.084975 .1237276 
Clerks .6557181*** 1.926526*** .1900676 
Case Load -.0000975 .9999025 .0011116 
Computer Access -.1925587* .8248459* .0933876 
Prof .5682829*** 1.765233 *** .2723065 
MQ -.0074621 .9925657 .0277832 
CJ Term -1.025259*** .3587034 *** .0603599 
Os (offset) ---  
Random Intercept 
By Just .3404102 (.0615905) 
Log-likelihood                          -1153.4875 
 
***p<.01;  **p<.05; *p<.l 
Fixed effects are estimated directly as standard regression coefficients.  Random effects are 
entered as either intercepts or slopes, in this case intercept, and are indirectly estimated ac-
cording to the data’s structure; here by justice.   
 
 
                                                 
 159. See generally ALAN AGRESTI, AN INTRODUCTION TO CATEGORICAL DATA ANALYSIS (1996); J. SCOTT 
LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT VARIABLES (1997); Gary King, 
Statistical Models for Political Science Event Counts: Bias in Conventional Procedures and Evidence for the 
Exponential Poisson Regression Model, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 838 (1988). But see BEST, supra note 124, at 227-
38 (attempting to determine the causes of non-consensual behavior on the U.S. Supreme Court which pointed 
toward personnel changes, ideological factors, and size of the caseload, but unable to overcome issues of multi-
collinearity). The Poisson Mixed Effects Model was estimated using Stata/SE 10.0 xtmepoisson function and 
maximum likelihood estimation.    
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The incidence-rate ratios (“IRR”) included in the third column of Table 3 represent 
factor change in the expected number of written concurrences per year by Justice, for 
given values of all other covariates.160 As we expected, increased access to law clerks 
has a significant positive effect with an estimated 93% increase on the expected number 
of written concurrences per year by Justice with access to four clerks compared to two 
clerks, for given values of all other covariates. This suggests that on average, increasing 
the number of clerks available to Justices significantly increases the likelihood that a Jus-
tice will write separately when compared to the likelihood that a Justice with two clerks 
will write separately. Though not all Justices opted to utilize the additional clerk support, 
this effect has a strong and positive effect on separate opinion-writing across the 
board.161  Having prior experience as a law professor has a positive effect of a similar 
magnitude (approximately 77% increase on expected count), which suggests that Su-
preme Court Justices with this professional background are more likely to write a con-
currence than their colleagues. Also, in line with others who have found that Chief Jus-
tices are less likely to write separately,162 our Chief Justice variable is significant and 
negative, suggesting this position of leadership decreases the expected number of written 
concurrences per year by Justice by approximately 64% for the given values of all other 
covariates. 
As expected, the covariates Age and Lexis are positive in direction and the case-
load covariate negative, suggesting that as age increases, caseload decreases, and access 
to Lexis-Nexis becomes available, the expected number of written concurrences per Jus-
tice per year increases. However, these covariates fail to reach statistical significance. 
The Martin-Quinn covariate is also negative in direction, which suggests that as Justices 
become more conservative in ideology, the expected number of written concurrences per 
Justice per year decreases. Though an interesting directional relationship, again this co-
variate did not reach significance. Two covariates stand out for their unexpected negative 
direction: use of the certiorari pool and access to computers. Use of the certiorari pool 
and access to computers decreases the expected number of written concurrences per year 




                                                 
 160. We provide both coefficients and incidence-rate ratios (“IRR”) in Table 3. However, we focus on IRRs 
because Poisson regression coefficients are interpreted as, for a one-unit change in the predictor, the difference 
in the logs of expected counts is expected to change by the regression coefficient, given the other variables are 
held constant at their values. This interpretation is not intuitive by any means; for this reason we opt to use 
IRRs. IRRs are akin to the use of odds-ratio in logit models. IRRs tell us the change in the incidence rate for a 
unit change in a given variable. We interpret this as a one-unit increase in the likelihood a Justice will write 
separately per year, given values of other variables. In other words, what factors increase the likelihood a Jus-
tice will write separately in a given year? 
 161. One possible explanation for this is that the increase in clerks was concomitant with an increased expec-
tation to write separately. Another possibility is that those Justices opting to use additional clerks were able to 
write more because of the additional help, while Justices who opted against the use of additional clerks either 
did not require additional help to write more, or felt pressure to write more despite the support of only two 
clerks versus four.  
 162. See, e.g., Saul Brenner & Eric S. Heberlig, “In My Opinion…”: Justices’ Opinion Writing in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 1946-1997, 83, SOC. SCI. Q. 762, 772 (2002).  
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We hypothesized that increased institutional capacity reinforces a normative infra-
structure that encourages concurrence-writing and non-consensual behavior. The results 
indicate that both institutional and individual-level characteristics influence the expected 
number of concurrences a Justice will write per year. 
Discussion 
In the tradition of other scholars who have sought to understand the impact of insti-
tutional practices and their effect on decision-making, we have considered several ways 
in which institutional characteristics set the stage for behavior exhibited on the Court. 
For instance, scholars such as Maltzman, Spriggs II, and Wahlbeck163 argue that mem-
bers of the Court are interdependent participants in the decision-making game, and 
scholars in this tradition have compiled a persuasive stockpile of evidence to suggest that 
this is so.164 However, in order to participate interdependently in the decision-making 
“game,” it is important to account for the institutional characteristics that provide Justic-
es with the capacity to pursue strategic behavior. Other scholars, such as Gerber and 
Park,165 have pursued a similar line of argument and have shown that the institutional 
characteristics of the Supreme Court lead to nonconsensual opinion-writing, but what are 
those specific characteristics? 
Our findings suggest that the opportunity for cost-lowering effects of law clerks 
and technology access are both significant to our understanding of the persistence of 
non-consensual norms. We have argued that these developments have diminished the 
ability of Chief Justices (or senior Associate Justices) to foster consensual opinion-
writing, especially when managing fissures in jurisprudential thought. Our quantitative 
analysis demonstrates a sizable effect for the role of law clerks, and suggests that Court 
personnel lower the opportunity costs of writing separately. This makes research that has 
been conducted on the role of law clerks in the decision-making process particularly in-
teresting.166 Baum and Distlear, for instance, find that in recent years Justices have been 
more likely to choose ideologically-driven clerks.167  As law clerks assume a greater role 
in the opinion-writing process,168 we should expect to observe fewer opinions capable of 
satisfying all nine Justices. 
While we find that clerks play a significant role in a Justice’s decision to write 
separately, we find that Lexis-Nexis has no significant effect on the decision to write 
separately.169 Although Lexis-Nexis is not a significant covariate, we caution against 
                                                 
 163. Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Judicial Choice: New Institu-
tionalist Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING 43 (Cornell 
W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999). 
 164.  See generally FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON 
THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000). 
 165. Scott D. Gerber & Keeok Park, The Quixotic Search for Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court: A 
Cross-Judicial Empirical Analysis of the Rehnquist Court Justices, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 390, 404-06 (1997). 
 166.  See generally Corey Distlear & Lawrence Baum, Selection of Law Clerks and Polarization in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 63 J. POL. 869 (2001).  
 167. Id. 
 168.  Peppers & Zorn, supra note 124, at 56. 
 169.  See supra Table 3. 
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dismissing the role of this particular technology. The role of legal search engines may be 
more complicated than we have suggested in our analysis, and accurately representing 
the effects of this technology raises a number of methodological challenges. For in-
stance, it may be important to identify the conditions under which a law clerk or justice 
understands how to use the program. Moreover, some law clerks may have already had 
access to legal databases on their personal computers prior to the date we have identified 
as the adoption of the technology by the Court. The use of technology by Justices and 
law clerks is a grey area, which should be further illuminated by additional research. 
We also note that the size of the Court’s plenary docket has a negative relationship 
with the expected count of separate opinions.170 This suggests that a decrease in the size 
of the Court’s plenary docket frees up time for Justices to consider writing separately. 
Independent of our other variables, this finding is insignificant and does not contribute to 
our understanding of the heightened capacity Justices have during the opinion-writing 
stage. In our analysis, however, we consider other administrative reforms that were in-
tended to provide greater institutional capacity to the Court, such as the creation of the 
certiorari pool and the hiring of additional law clerks. 
The decision to create a certiorari pool was initially designed to cut back on the 
time Justices devote to screening petitions reaching the Supreme Court.171 Our finding 
that use of the certiorari pool is negatively related to concurrence-writing leads us to be-
lieve that the reform has not had the intended effect, either because it does not free up 
more time for justices or because justices who opt in are inclined to write fewer concur-
rences than justices who opt out.172 The choice to opt in to the certiorari pool likely 
comes with problems of moral hazard, and one explanation may be that the certiorari 
pool is inherently inefficient because Justices must spend time scrutinizing memos writ-
ten by clerks from other chambers. Another explanation may be that those Justices who 
do not participate in the certiorari pool do so for personal reasons (such as being more 
detail-oriented or less trusting of their colleagues) that might also lead them to prefer to 
write separate opinions. In other words, these Justices may have personal characteristics 
that make them less “consensual” at all levels of the decision-making process. 
We also tested several individual-level characteristics in hopes of gaining a better 
understanding of what contributes to the decision to write separately. As our results indi-
cate, age is not significant in explaining why Justices choose to author separate concur-
ring opinions.173 It may be the case that age affects individual Justices differently, thus 
leading some Justices to alter their decision-writing practices while leaving others unaf-
fected. Our test of the professional background of Justices, however, appears to factor 
into the calculation to write separately. Those Justices having experience as law profes-
sors are more likely to write separate opinions than Justices who began their careers in 
other professions.174 These Justices, such as Breyer and Scalia, who often travel or speak 
                                                 
 170.  Id. 
 171. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER, supra note 126, at 140. 
 172.  See supra Table 3. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id.  
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publicly to promote their jurisprudential views, may maintain an intellectual curiosity as 
Justices which naturally leads them to seek individual expression through separate opin-
ions. One’s rank on the Court also contributes to the likelihood of authoring separate 
opinions. Chief Justices are less likely to write concurring opinions either because they 
normally assign opinions to Justices with similar views, or suppress their own views in 
order to promote more consensual opinions. 
Finally, in keeping with research that emphasizes the role of ideology in the deci-
sion-making process, we argue that more conservative Justices would be more likely to 
write concurring opinions. According to our test of this variable, conservative Justices 
are less likely to author concurring opinions than liberal Justices, but this variable fails to 
reach levels of statistical significance. Although this variable does not reach significance, 
it suggests that arguments which implicate fissures in legal liberalism should be tested 
further.175 On reflection, the role ideology plays in the opinion-writing process is likely 
more qualitative in nature. The opinion-writing process is complex and strategic as Jus-
tices seek to attract a majority opinion that holds precedential value and is closest to their 
sincere preferences. This process raises the possibility that many potential concurrences 
have already been incorporated in the language of majority opinions.176 
Conclusion 
Walker, Epstein, and Dixon argue that the dramatic decline of consensus and the 
concurrent increase in separate opinions is an artifact of the leadership of Chief Justic-
es.177 On the other hand, O’Brien argues that norm change can be traced back to Ameri-
can legal realism and the rise of legal liberalism as a result of Roosevelt’s appoint-
ments.178 Yet, both explanations fall short of explaining why consensual norms have not 
returned since the 1980s because both Chief Justice Rehnquist and now Roberts are con-
sidered strong leaders. Furthermore, since 1992, the Court has been dominated by Justic-
es who eschew legal liberalism, with the New Right consolidating control over the Court. 
We argue that a combination of the fissures within conservative jurisprudence and 
the normative infrastructure which enable Justices to write more separate opinions has 
                                                 
 175. See, e.g., O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1. If, in fact, fissures within legal liberalism alone 
explain the persistence of non-consensual opinion-writing practices, liberal ideology as measured by Martin-
Quinn scores should have been a significant predictor in our model. Since the covariate failed to reach signifi-
cance, it seems the effect of fissures within legal liberalism is either not of the magnitude O’Brien claims, or 
are subsumed by the effects of shifts in infrastructure and individual-level characteristics.   
 176. Assuming that liberal or conservative Justices who spend a considerable amount of intellectual effort 
drafting majority opinions want their opinions to hold precedential value, then the threat of a concurrence 
should lead to the incorporation of moderate viewpoints, all else being equal. Thus, the lack of consensual 
opinion-writing on the Court may be better understood as the collapse of equilibrium in opinion-writing prac-
tices. This means that moderate Justices, when faced with a majority opinion that is too conservative or too 
liberal, must take the time to use concurrences as credible threats for leverage in future opinion-writing pro-
cesses. Increased capacity to write separately reinforces the lack of equilibrium on the Court. It should, there-
fore, be necessary that Justices write concurring opinions from time to time because it is in their long-term in-
terest to do so. If the threat to write a concurrence becomes no longer credible, then moderate Justices will 
likely write more concurrences in the long run to express their individual views, all else being equal, thus in-
creasing their opportunity costs and taking time away from other pursuits they consider to be important. 
 177. Walker, Epstein & Dixon, supra note 10, at 384-88. 
 178. See generally O’Brien, Institutional Norms, supra note 1. 
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contributed to the persistence of non-consensual norms and hampered the ability of the 
chief justice to change the Court’s opinion-writing behavior. Although we did not test 
directly for the New Right’s contribution to the increased number of concurrences on the 
Court, our inclusion of ideology in the model does suggest a directional, though insignif-
icant association between liberal Justices and concurring opinions. We feel it is im-
portant to examine this effect on opinion-writing in future research. 
Since norms have shifted, an infrastructure providing the conditions for a strategic 
choice mechanism has prevented the court from reverting back to the days when it was 
more likely to craft consensual decisions. Indicators of the Court’s capacity provide per-
suasive evidence that institutional arrangements have a significant impact on the court’s 
operation. Our findings indicate that law clerks significantly affect the operation of the 
Court, providing Justices with the capacity to author more concurring opinions. In addi-
tion to these institutional-level variables, some Justices simply are more likely to author 
concurring opinions than others. These findings suggest that professional background 
and rank on the Court lead some Justices to write separately more often than their col-
leagues. 
These findings have important implications for understanding the operation of the 
court as an institution. One implication is that Supreme Court Justices operate under sig-
nificant time constraints that lead them to adopt reforms that may or may not have in-
tended consequences. Certainly it was not the intention of members of the Court or Con-
gress to provide more law clerks so that Justices could draft more concurring opinions. 
Whether or not the drafting of concurring opinions should be viewed positively or nega-
tively, we feel, is a matter of debate. Another implication is that scholars should be more 
cognizant of the institutional characteristics under which judges operate, and how those 
characteristics influence decision-making, especially the observation that the institution-
alization of law clerks provides the capacity for Justices to pursue their preferences stra-
tegically. 
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